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Abstract 
Laboratory based experimental studies with human participants are beneficial for testing hypotheses 
in behavioural operational research.  However, such experiments are not without their problems.  One 
specific problem is obtaining a sufficient sample size, not only in terms of the number of participants, 
but also the time they are willing to devote to an experiment.  In this paper we explore how agent-
based simulation can be used to address the sample size problem and demonstrate the approach in the 
newsvendor setting.  The decision-making strategies of a small sample of individual decision-makers 
are determined through laboratory experiments.  The interactions of these suppliers and retailers are 
then simulated using an agent-based simulation (ABS) to generate a large sample set of decisions.  
With only a small number of participants, we demonstrate that it is possible to produce similar results 
to previous experimental studies that involved much larger sample sizes.  We conclude that agent-
based simulation provides the potential to extend the scope of experimental research in behavioural 
operational research. 
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Addressing the Sample Size Problem in Behavioural Operational Research:  
Simulating the Newsvendor Problem 
 
1. Introduction 
 
With the developing interest in behavioural operational research (OR) (Hämälläinen et al, 2013) there 
is a need to adopt experimental research methods such as those long used in behavioural psychology, 
and more recently adopted in fields such as behavioural economics and behavioural operations 
management.  Laboratory experiments are beneficial for testing hypotheses while controlling for the 
conditions under which participants work; something that cannot easily be achieved in real world 
experiments.  As an example that has been extensively investigated, work in behavioural operations 
management uses laboratory experiments to study the actual performance of supply chain contracts.  
In these studies decision-makers, normally students, make decisions in supply chain games under 
different contractual arrangements (e.g. wholesale price, buyback and revenue sharing contracts).  
These studies consistently demonstrate that human decision-makers perform very differently to the 
rational-optimising decision-makers assumed in mathematical algorithms.  Katok and Wu (2009), for 
instance, demonstrate that the improvement obtained from using the buyback and revenue sharing 
contracts are not as great as expected in the presence of ‘real’ decision-makers.   
 
Although valuable, laboratory experiments are not without their problems.  One difficulty arises in the 
selection of participants.  Convenience often leads to the use of students.  Whilst there is evidence that 
they can outperform managers on experimental tasks (Bakken et al, 1994), is the use of students 
always appropriate?  In operational research our ultimate aim is to work with real decision-makers 
working on real problems in order to bring about an improvement.  In this case, student participants 
would almost certainly not suffice.  Beyond the choice of participants, Wynder (2004) identifies a 
series of factors that can affect a participant’s performance in laboratory experiments: providing a 
problem that interests and engages the participants; ensuring that participants have the necessary skills 
for the task; establishing criteria for participants to self-assess and validate their performance during 
the task; use of extrinsic motivators, especially whether monetary incentives are beneficial. 
  
Obtaining a sufficient sample size can be particularly problematic at three levels: the number of 
participants, the length of time the participants spend on the task (number of decisions made), and, 
where required, the number of pairings of participants.  It can be very challenging and time-
consuming to obtain a large number of participants for a study, even if the participants are students.  
Also, large sample sizes can be costly to obtain when financial incentives are provided.  Meanwhile, if 
the experiment is to be performed with real decision-makers, then the sample size is dictated by the 
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size of the available workforce.  For instance, Robinson et al. (2012) only managed to obtain a sample 
of eight decision-makers when working in a Ford manufacturing plant. 
 
However, the sample size problem is not only manifested in the number of participants, but also in the 
length of time they work on the task.  Some experimental research requires the participants to make a 
series of consecutive decisions.  There are limits to the time that a participant is willing to devote to 
an experimental task and also limits to their level of concentration.  Hence, the size and quality of a 
sample of decisions from a participant is constrained.  Added to this, it is sometimes useful to ask 
participants to play against each other in a ‘gaming’ environment, for instance, in the ‘beer game’ 
(Senge, 1990).  This further adds to the complexity of the experiment and the number of groups of 
partnerships that can be tested.  Given differences in decision-making strategies, it could be useful to 
play every participant against every other participant, but practically impossible to do so due to the 
time commitment involved.  
 
In this paper we explore the use of agent-based simulation (ABS) to address the issue of sample size 
in experimental research.  Our focus is on the case where there are only a few participants, as would 
often occur in real decision-making situations.  We then use the ABS to address the second and third 
sample size issues: the length of time the participants spend on the task and the number of pairings of 
participants.  Because extensive experimental research on supply chain contracts already exists, we 
base our work in this problem domain, focusing specifically on the well studied newsvendor problem 
and the wholesale price contract (Whitin, 1955).  The difference with our approach is that we only 
require a small number of participants.  By learning the decision-making strategies of these 
participants, we are then able to simulate every (retailer and supplier) participant playing with each 
other over a long-run game.  Our ABS generates similar results to previous experimental studies 
which require much larger numbers of participants.  We believe that this feature of requiring fewer 
participants makes the approach attractive, especially in cases where the input of only a few (real 
world) decision-makers can be obtained. 
 
Because the focus of this paper is on the newsvendor problem, the next section outlines the 
newsvendor problem, the wholesale price contract and previous experimental research on this and 
related problems.  In section 3, we provide an overview of the design of the study.  We describe the 
implementation of the study, including the development of the ABS, in section 4.  In section 5, we 
report the results from the ABS.  In section 6 we discuss the benefits of the ABS, the limitations of the 
work and the potential for future research.   
 
  
4 
 
2. The Newsvendor Problem and Prior Experimental Research 
 
As already noted, supply chain contracts have been extensively studied using laboratory-based 
experiments.  Examples include the work of Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), Croson and Donohue 
(2006), Loch and Wu (2008), Wu (2013) and Schiffels et al (2014).  These studies typically use 
students as participants, sometimes working with an automated supply chain partner and sometimes 
working with another student.  Financial inducements are often provided both for participating in the 
study and also in relation to performance on the task.   
 
In this section we briefly review this work and its key findings, as well as identify the sample sizes 
these studies employ.  First we set out the theoretical background to the newsvendor problem and the 
wholesale price contract. 
 
2.1 Theoretical Background: The Newsvendor Problem and Wholesale Price Contract 
 
Consider the typical newsvendor setting under the wholesale price contract, as illustrated in Figure 1 
(Whitin, 1955).  In advance of each time period t, the supplier specifies the wholesale price w that 
he/she wishes to charge to the retailer.  In response, the retailer chooses an order quantity q.  It is 
assumed that the supplier instantaneously delivers the full order quantity to the retailer.  The retailer is 
then responsible for satisfying the market demand d, which is stochastic in nature.  The product only 
lasts for one selling season and so inventory is not carried over from one time period to the next.  
Therefore, based on the quantity ordered from the supplier in the current time period, the retailer 
either fully satisfies the market demand (d), or sends the maximum amount of product available (q).  
The retailer sells each unit of product at price p, while the supplier incurs a unitary production cost c.  
For each unit of demand the retailer does not satisfy, the retailer incurs a goodwill penalty cost of g.   
 
Figure 1 The decentralised newsvendor problem, under the wholesale price contract 
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Under the assumption that the two supply chain partners are self-interested, rational-optimising 
decision-makers, they would make the following decisions (denoted by *).  In every time period t, a 
rational-optimising supplier would charge a wholesale price w*, so as to maximise his/her expected 
profit P𝑠𝑠 (Cachon, 2003): 
  
𝑃𝑃s
∗ = 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚{P𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤, 𝑞𝑞)} = (𝑤𝑤∗ − 𝑐𝑐)𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟∗ 
 
(1) 
In (1), 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟∗ represents the order quantity that the rational-optimising retailer would place in response to 
the price w*, such that 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟∗ = arg[max P𝑠𝑠(𝑤𝑤, 𝑞𝑞)].  Since the rational-optimising retailer is exclusively 
interested in maximising his/her expected profit P𝑟𝑟 in response to the price w*, he/she would order 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟∗ 
products (Lariviere, 1999; Lariviere and Porteus, 2001; Cachon, 2003):  
 
𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟
∗ = 𝐹𝐹−1 �𝑝𝑝 + 𝑔𝑔 − 𝑤𝑤∗
𝑝𝑝 + 𝑔𝑔 � (2) 
 
The resulting aggregate channel profit P𝑐𝑐 = P𝑠𝑠 + P𝑟𝑟 where: 
 
P𝑟𝑟 = (𝑝𝑝 + 𝑔𝑔)𝑆𝑆(𝑞𝑞) − 𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔 − 𝑤𝑤𝑞𝑞 (3) 
 
S(q) is the expected sales of the retailer (Cachon, 2003) and μ is the mean level of the demand. 
 
An alternative strategy would be to centralise the decision-making, creating an integrated supply 
chain.  The rational-optimising integrated newsvendor would order as many products (𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ) so as to 
maximise his/her expected profit P𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (Khouja, 1999; Lariviere, 1999):  
 
𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
∗ = 𝐹𝐹−1 �𝑝𝑝 + 𝑔𝑔 − 𝑐𝑐
𝑝𝑝 + 𝑔𝑔 � (4) 
 
As an example, which we use as the basis of our experimental study in the rest of this paper, assume 
that p=250, c=50, g=1, and that customer demand follows the truncated at zero normal distribution 
with μn=140 and σ = 80 (where μn refers to the mean of the non-truncated normal).  Under these 
circumstances the rational-optimising integrated newsvendor would order 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 209.87 units and 
only incur the production cost 𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑐𝑐, leading the entire channel to the first-best case aggregate 
profit of 𝑃𝑃int∗ = 24,098.74 (Halkos and Kevork, 2011). 
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Under decentralised control, the rational-optimising supplier would charge w*=174.75, and the 
rational-optimising retailer would place an order of q*=105.18.  This would result in individual profits 
of 𝑃𝑃s∗ = 13,120.77 and 𝑃𝑃r∗ = 4,742.02 respectively, and an aggregate channel profit of 𝑃𝑃c∗ =17,862.79.  As expected, the profits under decentralised control are much lower than in the integrated 
case.  The efficiency score for decentralised control is 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸 = 𝑃𝑃c∗
𝑃𝑃int
∗ = 0.741 < 1, demonstrating the 
theoretical inefficiency of the wholesale price contract.  
 
2.2 Findings from Experimental Studies on Supply Chain Contracts 
 
In reality human decision-makers take different decisions to their rational-optimising counterparts, 
leading to very different overall performances in the newsvendor setting from those that are 
theoretically expected.  Indeed, previous experimental research has confirmed that human 
newsvendors’ order quantities and price decisions consistently diverge from the rational-optimising 
levels predicted by the standard normative models (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Keser and 
Paleologo, 2004; Loch and Wu, 2008; Katok and Wu, 2009; Kalkanci et al, 2011; Elahi et al, 2013; 
Wu, 2013; Moritz et al, 2013).  For instance, there is experimental evidence of the ‘pull-to-centre’ 
effect, in which human retailers order too few of high profit products and too many of low profit 
products (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2000; Bostian et al, 2008).  This is contradicted, however, by Elahi 
et al (2013), who find that human retailers order considerably more than the optimum quantity of a 
high profit product.  In the experimental studies by Keser and Paleologo (2004), Loch and Wu (2008) 
and Wu (2013), the human suppliers charge lower prices than would a rational-optimising supplier. 
 
With respect to supply chain efficiency, in the experimental study by Keser and Paleologo (2004) the 
wholesale price contract with human decision-makers leads to a very similar efficiency to that 
predicted for the rational-optimising decision-makers.  However, Katok and Wu (2009) find that the 
wholesale price contract performs better (higher efficiency) in their laboratory experiment than 
theoretically predicted due to an initial over ordering behaviour; although they do note that this may 
have been due to the specific game parameters and so this is not necessarily a general result.  They 
also show that the buy-back and revenue sharing contracts do not perform as well, in terms of 
efficiency, in a laboratory setting as theoretically predicted.   
 
Unlike Keser and Paleologo, Katok and Wu control for social preference by studying suppliers and 
retailers separately.  They believe that Keser and Paleologo’s findings may have emerged because 
their results are subject to social preference, that is, decision-makers are not solely interested in their 
own profit, but include social considerations in their decision-making, such as, reciprocity, fairness, 
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status seeking and group identity (Loch and Wu, 2008; Wu and Niederhoff, 2014).  To address this 
potential bias, Loch and Wu (2008) perform an experimental study to investigate the impact of social 
preference on supply chain performance.  They show that relationship preference improves system 
efficiency, while status preference reduces efficiency.   
 
Recent work has focused on providing explanations for deviations in performance between human 
decision-makers and theoretical predications, with an emphasis on developing behavioural models.  
Moritz et al (2013) investigate the relationship between cognitive reflection (Frederick, 2005) and 
decision-making in the newsvendor context through an experimental study involving students and 
supply chain managers.  They find that cognitive reflection is a better predictor of performance than 
level of education or real world experience.  Kalkanci et al (2011) adopt an experience-weighted 
attraction learning model to data from their experimental study.  The model shows that as contract 
complexity increases, humans rely more on simple heuristics for decision-making.  Meanwhile, 
through behavioural modelling, Becker-Peth et al (2013) show that decision-makers anchor on mean 
demand, aim to avoid losses and place different values on alternative income streams.  They argue 
that contracts should be designed to take these factors into account. 
 
These studies show varying performance levels of human decision-makers in terms of supply chain 
efficiency.  What they demonstrate is that human decision-makers can perform at least as well as their 
rational-optimising counterparts when working under the wholesale price contract, but they fall short 
of obtaining the aggregate profit that is achievable in a fully coordinated supply chain.   
 
2.3 Sample Size in Experimental Studies on Supply Chain Contracts 
 
We now explore the approach taken in the literature to the three sample size problems, namely: 
number of participants, number of decision rounds and combinations of participants playing against 
each other.  The reported studies generally involve over 100 participants.  For instance, Bolton and 
Katok (2008) used 234, mostly undergraduate, students; Loch and Wu (2008) worked with 168 
subjects – students of varying backgrounds; Katok and Wu (2009) involved 200 participants; de 
Véricourt et al (2013) worked with 102 MBA students; and Schiffels et al (2014) have a sample of 
148 students.  There are some studies that use a smaller number of participants, for instance, 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) use 34 and then 44 participants in their two experiments. 
 
In terms of the number of decisions participants are asked to make, this is normally quite small; at 
most 30.  For example, Schweitzer and Cachon (2000), Keser and Paleologo (2004) and Schiffels et al 
(2014) all work with 30 decisions.  Meanwhile, de Véricourt et al (2013) asked participants to play 
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only 20 rounds and Loch and Wu (2008) obtained only 15 decisions from each participant.  Bolton 
and Katok (2008) and Wu (2013) do record more extensive data sets, asking participants to make 100 
decisions as retailers, and Katok and Wu (2009) asked their participants to play for 200 rounds. 
 
Most of the reported studies do not involve multiple participants playing against one another.  Among 
the few studies that do are Keser and Paleologo (2004), Loch and Wu (2008), Ho and Zhang (2008) 
and Wu (2013).  In each case, the experiment only involves a single pairing of players and it does not 
involve observing participants working with different partners. 
 
3. Study Approach 
 
In this study a small number of participants (seven) act as suppliers and retailers in the newsvendor 
setting.  We use regression models to represent their decision-making strategies and then model those 
strategies in an ABS.  This allows us to play every retailer participant in a pairing with every supplier 
participant.  Our aim is to determine whether the use of ABS can address the sample size problem by 
enabling us to model multiple partnerships over a large number of decisions, based on data collected 
from a small sample of participants.  In so doing, we compare our results with those from earlier 
studies that involve many more participants, but do not employ ABS. 
 
Figure 2 presents the four stages in the experimental study that we performed: understanding the 
decision-making process, conducting the gaming sessions, fitting the decision-making strategies, and 
running the ABS model.  This approach is based on the knowledge based improvement methodology 
of Robinson et al (2005).  Supplier and retailer simulation games are designed out of stage 1.  These 
games are then run with human agents in stage 2 to generate separate sets of decision-making data for 
each agent.  In stage 3 those data sets are used to create regression based decision models, which are 
then run with a simple Excel-VBA agent based model of the supplier-retailer interactions (stage 4).  
The pricing and ordering decisions, and profits achieved, are recorded as the key outcomes.  For this 
study, the parameters used for the newsvendor problem are those set out in the example presented in 
section 2. 
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Figure 2 The experimental study: developing and using the agent-based simulation  
 
 
 
The purpose of stage 1 is to understand the factors (‘decision attributes’) which inform the decisions 
(‘decision variables’) that the two agents (supplier and retailer) make.  We know from the structure of 
the newsvendor problem that the supplier makes decisions about the wholesale price and in response 
the retailer determines the order quantity.  To determine the potential decision attributes a series of 
pilot sessions were run with volunteers.  In each session the volunteers made their decisions with full 
information available to them, that is, all attribute values from every round.  The sessions were 
followed by interviews in which we asked which attributes the participants had used to make their 
decisions.  In this way we were able to isolate a set of potential decision attributes. 
 
Stage 2 consists of gaming sessions based on the decision variables and attributes identified in stage 1.  
These sessions were performed separately with each participant.  A participant assumed a particular 
role (supplier or retailer) and proceeded to make a series of decisions (enters a decision variable) in 
response to a predetermined set of scenarios (set of decision attributes).  The same scenarios were 
presented to each supplier participant, and another set of scenarios were used with each retail 
participant.  The decisions made by each participant in each round were recorded, creating a separate 
dataset of decisions variables and decision attributes for each participant. 
 
Each participant is assumed to follow his/her own decision-making strategy, and so there is a unique 
relationship between each participant’s decision variables and their decision attributes.  In order to 
determine each participant’s specific decision-making strategy, separate multiple regression models 
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were fitted in Stage 3 using the datasets of decision variables (dependent variable) and decisions 
attributes (independent variables).  
 
The ABS model of the newsvendor problem was then developed around the decision variables 
(inputs) and decision attributes (outputs).  The model, developed in Excel-VBA, includes these inputs 
and outputs, and the sequence in which material, funds, and information are moved at each time step 
as described in Figure 1.  The decision models for each supplier and retailer can be implanted into the 
model so as to represent any combination of supplier-retailer interaction.  Excel-VBA was chosen, 
rather than specialist ABS software (e.g. NetLogo, Repast or AnyLogic), because the structure of the 
model is relatively simple.  Indeed, VBA is only required to control the multiple replications of the 
model runs. 
 
Finally, in stage 4, the model was run for an extended period (1,800 time periods and 100 
replications) with different combinations of supplier and retailer decision-making strategies, as 
represented by the multiple regression models.  This enabled the combined performance of each 
supplier working with each retailer to be predicted in terms of price and quantity decisions, and in 
terms of the profit attained. 
 
4. Developing and Using the Agent-Based Simulation (ABS) 
 
We now describe, in detail, how each stage of the study was implemented, including the details of the 
regression based decision models of the human suppliers and the retailers. 
 
4.1 Stage 1: Understanding the Decision-Making Process  
 
From the pilot sessions and interviews we ascertained that the human suppliers (i = SUP) base each 
period’s wholesale price decision w(t) on the following three decision attributes:  
  
i.  The previously charged wholesale price w(t - 1)  
ii.  The previously placed order quantity q(t - 1)  
iii. The previously realised profit  𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡 − 1)  
 
Meanwhile, the retailers (j = RET) made their order quantity decisions q(t) taking into consideration:  
 
i. The currently charged wholesale price w(t)  
ii. The last period’s order quantity q(t - 1)  
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iii. The previously observed demand d(t - 1)  
iv. The previously realised profit 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡 − 1)  
 
Despite the availability of a full history of decision attributes, in the interviews the participants stated 
that they ignored all information except for that pertaining to the previous (t – 1) or current (t) round.  
This reliance on recent information relates to the individual bias of ‘immediacy’ identified by 
Camerer (1995) and Loch and Wu (2007).  It also typifies ‘salience’ in which decision-makers are 
selective about the information they use.   
 
Those that acted as suppliers explained that they had relied heavily on the retailers’ previous order 
quantities for their price decisions.  Meanwhile the retailers had relied on the previous round’s 
demand for their decisions.  The reason was that they could not predict with certainty the incoming 
order quantities or demand, respectively.  Camerer (1995) and Loch and Wu (2007) identify this 
tendency to rely on the information that is available as a means for dealing with the underlying 
uncertainty in the decision situation. 
 
The participants reported difficulty in understanding how their decisions would affect their profits and 
the system’s overall performance.  Therefore, in order to make their decisions, they used their profit 
from the previous round.  This use of simple heuristics arises from the complexity that is inherent 
within the newsvendor problem (Kalkanci et al, 2011). 
 
Therefore, supplier i’s decision function is expressed as: 
 
[ ]( ) ( 1), ( 1), ( 1)i siw t f w t q t P t= − − −           (5) 
 
and retailer j’s decision function as: 
  
〈𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡)〉𝑗𝑗 = 𝐸𝐸𝑗𝑗[𝑤𝑤(𝑡𝑡), 𝑞𝑞(𝑡𝑡 − 1),𝑑𝑑(𝑡𝑡 − 1),𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡 − 1)] (6) 
 
4.2 Stage 2: The Gaming Sessions 
 
Volunteers were recruited from a pool of graduate students at the University of Warwick. The only 
requirement set was that all participants had received formal classroom training in the newsvendor 
problem prior to the experiment as part of their curriculum.  The reason is that an earlier empirical 
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study has confirmed the superior performance of well-trained students acting as newsvendors 
compared to experienced supply chain managers (Bolton et al, 2008).  
 
Volunteers were randomly assigned to play either the role of the supplier or the retailer against an 
automated retailer or supplier, respectively.  They worked with a computer interface, written in Excel 
VBA, that simulated the interacting partner’s responses.  Provision of automated players may not 
have been as realistic as direct interaction of human suppliers and retailers, but it mitigated the effects 
of social preference and reputation, such as, for example, players’ possible concern regarding fairness, 
reciprocity, status seeking and group identity (Loch and Wu, 2008; Katok and Wu, 2009).   
 
In total, four participants acted as retailers (denoted RET1 to RET4) and three as suppliers (denoted 
SUP1 to SUP3).  Written instructions on the required task were distributed to all participants well in 
advance of the allocated session so that they could familiarise themselves with the task and the 
software as quickly as possible.  The instructions informed them that the product under study was a 
perishable widget with random customer demand.  They were also made aware that each round’s 
demand was independent of any previous round’s, but they were not informed about the exact type of 
distribution that the customer demand followed.  This follows Bearden and Rapoport’s (2005) 
contention that decision-makers are unlikely to know the nature of the ‘operative’ distribution in a 
decision situation.  Although the instructions asked participants to make decisions that, to the best of 
their knowledge, would maximise supply chain profit, they were only supplied with information on 
their own profit at the end of each round.  As such, they could only focus on their own profit.   
  
In case the participants required any clarifications, they could address questions both before the start 
of the session and during its course.  Nevertheless, the game could not be re-started at any time.  We 
ran the game for 50 consecutive rounds.  In order to give participants some time to get used to their 
new roles, the first 10 rounds were used for practice.  This gave a total of 40 periods of actual data for 
each participant, providing at least 10 samples per decision attribute.   This complied with the 
minimum sample size recommended by Weisberg (2005) and Hair et al (2006).  After every period 
participants received feedback on their previous decisions and their realised profit; the retailer also 
received feedback on the previous round’s demand.  The participants were not aware of the session’s 
duration so that end-of-game effects could be eliminated (Schweitzer and Cachon, 2003; Steckel et al, 
2004; Loch and Wu, 2008).   
 
All participants acting as suppliers were asked to play against the same automated retailer.  In 
response to the wholesale price set by the human supplier, the automated retailer placed orders 
according to a truncated at zero normal distribution, N(μn, σ).  The sample value was determined 
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using the probability 1 − �𝑤𝑤(𝑖𝑖−1)
𝑝𝑝+𝑔𝑔
�.  In order to ensure consistency across the different subjects, the 
automated retailer used the same ordering strategy in all the gaming sessions.  Figure 3 provides an 
indicative example of one of the participants’ w-decisions over time (SUP2), each period representing 
the next decision in the sequence of 50 rounds.  It is evident that, with the exception of period 4, SUP2 
systematically set higher prices than would the rational-optimising supplier 𝑤𝑤∗.  It appears that in 
period 4 SUP2 was investigating the impact of a lower wholesale price.  This occurred during the 
‘practice’ period and so did not form part of SUP2’s sample of decisions. 
 
Figure 3 SUP2 w-decisions, as observed in the laboratory 
 
 
All participants acting as retailers were asked to play against the same automated supplier that 
exhibited the same pricing strategy, charging prices between c=50 and p=250, according to the 
uniform distribution.  Figure 4 presents RET1 q-decisions over time.  In this example RET1 on average 
orders almost exactly the same as the rational-optimising retailer (mean order is 105.4).   There is, 
however, a lot of variability in the order quantities of RET1, and there may have been some attempt to 
follow customer demand, ‘demand chasing’ (Benzion et al, 2008; Bostian et al, 2008), at least in a 
few periods.  Interestingly, RET1 chooses to order nothing in period 18 despite a high demand in the 
previous period.  This is likely to be either a mistake or a response to the price set by the supplier. 
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Figure 4 RET1 q-decisions, as observed in the laboratory 
 
 
4.3 Stage 3:  The Decision-Making Strategies 
 
All participants’ recorded w and q decisions satisfied the linearity, normality and hetero-skedasticity 
requirements of linear regression (Weisberg, 2005; Hair et al, 2006).  As a result, we portrayed each 
supplier’s (i) and retailer’s (j) decision-making strategies as first order auto-regressive time-series 
models according to equations (7) and (8) respectively.  In these equations, a time-lagged dependent 
variable is included as one of the explanatory variables (Mills, 1990; Box et al, 1994; Greene, 2003). 
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For all the human suppliers’ and retailer RET1’s decision models the corresponding profits 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡 − 1) 
and 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡 − 1) were removed from the list of independent variables due to the high multi-collinearity 
that existed between them and the remaining independent variables.  High multi-colinearity was 
exhibited by tolerance levels lower than 0.10.  Tolerance levels are defined as the amount of 
variability of 𝑃𝑃𝑠𝑠(𝑡𝑡 − 1) and 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡 − 1), respectively, that cannot be explained by the remaining 
independent variables (Hair et al, 2006).     
 
Since the lagged dependent variable constituted one of the explanatory variables in the decision 
models, there was auto-correlation in all collected data-sets.  This was confirmed by the Breusch-
Godfrey test (Breusch, 1978; Godfrey, 1978).  For this reason, the appropriate quasi-differences data 
transformations were applied.  Given the relatively small sample sizes and low values of correlation ρ, 
we preferred the respective ordinary least squares estimators over the feasible generalised least 
squares that are tailored to time-series processes (Rao and Griliches, 1969).   
 
The linear regression models that have been fitted to the human suppliers and retailers’ decisions, 
along with their corresponding t-values and p-values are presented in Tables 1 and 2.  The t- values 
show how significant the effect of each of the decision attributes was on the actual decisions that 
participants made.  The p-values demonstrate the lowest significance level for which the 
corresponding decision attributes would be taken into account for subjects’ i and j respective 
decisions ( )
i
w t  and ( )
j
q t .   
 
Table 1 Human suppliers’ linear regression decision models  
 
 SUP1 SUP2 SUP3 
 Coef. t-value p-value Coef. t-value p-value Coef.  t-value p-value 
0
iα  115.851 14.710 <0.001 43.929 4.919 <0.001 11.733 2.596 0.015 
i
wα  0.506 15.941 <0.001 0.769 19.098 <0.001 0.921 32.955 <0.001 
i
qα  -0.014 -0.708 0.485 0.011 0.404 0.689 -0.002 -0.097 0.923 
i
Pα  -   -   -   
Adj. R2 0.852 0.889 0.958 
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Table 2 Human retailers’ linear regression decision models  
 
 RET1 RET2 
 Coef. t-value p-value Coef. t-value p-value 
0
jβ  246.807 18.564 <0.001 258.416 12.294 <0.001 
j
wβ  -0.945 -17.686 <0.001 -1.030 -13.110 <0.001 
j
qβ  -0.033 -0.449 0.656 0.180 2.311 0.027 
j
dβ  -0.045 -0.852 0.400 0.262 3.018 0.005 
j
Pβ  -   -0.001 -3.146 0.003 
Adj. R2 0.867 0.778 
 RET3 RET4 
 Coef. t-value p-value Coef. t-value p-value 
0
jβ  246.067 14.492 <0.001 32.589 2.938 0.006 
j
wβ  -0.952 -18.690 <0.001 -0.048 -1.048 0.301 
j
qβ  0.035 0.469 0.642 0.455 5.797 <0.001 
j
dβ  0.173 2.285 0.028 0.029 0.794 0.432 
j
Pβ  -0.001 -1.591 0.120 0.002 6.785 <0.001 
Adj. R2 0.881 0.724 
 
We can see from Table 1 that all human suppliers (i=1,..,3) assigned significant importance to the 
wholesale price that they charged during the last period w(t-1) (all corresponding p-values<0.001).  
Although human suppliers did assign some marginal consideration to the retailer’s order quantity in 
the last period (qt-1), the corresponding p-values≥0.485 indicate that this effect might not statistically 
differ from zero.  Most probably it was because the suppliers lacked knowledge and control over the 
way that retailers’ order quantities would respond to their own prices so they tended to only base their 
w-decisions on their own previous w-prices.  Overall the decision models that we fitted to each human 
supplier were statistically significant at the 1% level and explained more than 85% of the total 
variation that existed in their recorded decisions (adj. R2).      
 
From Table 2 we can see that RET1, RET2 and RET3 concentrated on the wholesale price w(t) that they 
were charged (p-values<0.001).  RET4 adopted a very different strategy and chose to ignore this 
exogenously set price (p-value=0.301).  Instead he concentrated on his previous order quantity 
decision qt-1 and realised profit 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡 − 1) (p-values<0.001).  RET2 also took into account previous 
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demand d(t-1) and realised profit 𝑃𝑃𝑟𝑟(𝑡𝑡 − 1) for his order quantity decision (p-values of 0.005 and 
0.003 respectively).  Meanwhile, RET3 referenced demand in the last period d(t-1) when reaching an 
order quantity decision (p-value=0.028).  Overall the decision models that we fitted to human 
retailers’ decisions were statistically significant at the 1% level, and explained at least 72% of the total 
variation that was inherent in their recorded decisions (adj. R2).   
 
4.4 Stage 4: The Agent-Based Simulation (ABS) and the Model Runs 
 
The ABS of the newsvendor problem was developed in Excel-VBA.  The two agents (supplier and 
retailer) involved in the newsvendor problem satisfy the following characteristics of an agent (Macal 
and North, 2010): 
 
• Self-contained: they are uniquely identifiable individuals with a clear boundary across which 
they receive information and make decisions. 
• Autonomous: they are independent with their behaviour defined by unique individual linear 
regression models. 
• State that varies over time: the agents’ state varies over time, specifically with respect to the 
profit achieved in each period. 
• Social: both the supplier-agent and the retailer-agent are social with the ability to 
communicate with each other.  The wholesale price contract specifies the terms of trade and 
any exchange that occurs between them.    
• Goal directed: both the supplier-agent and the retailer-agent have separate goals to achieve 
and clearly defined internal logic rules that govern their actions.  They focus on maximising 
their own profit. 
• Heterogeneity: the agents follow their own intentions and adopt individual decision 
strategies.  Those strategies apply different weights to the information available to the agents. 
 
The only characteristic not satisfied by the agents in the newsvendor ABS model is to be adaptive.  
Their decision-making strategies are fixed, as represented by the linear regression models, and so the 
agents have no specific capability to learn.  Macal and North (2010) describe this as a useful, but not 
essential, characteristic of an agent. 
 
Figure 5 describes the logic of the ABS using state charts.  The interactions between the agents are 
shown by the dashed arrows.  In each round (time period, t) of the simulation the supplier agent sets 
the wholesale price (w), waits for the order from the retailer, delivers the order (q) to the retailer, waits 
for payment and then receives the payment (w.q) from the retailer.  Meanwhile, the retailer waits for 
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the price to be set by the supplier, then determines the order quantity (q), waits for the delivery from 
the supplier, satisfies the customer demand as much as is possible (Min (q, d)) and receives payment 
from the customer (p.Min(q.d)).  The decision-making strategies of the supplier and retailer agents 
with respect to setting w and q are represented by the regression equations set out in Table 1 and 
Table 2 respectively.  The profits for the supplier (Ps) and retailer (Pr) are calculated as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑃s = 𝑞𝑞(𝑤𝑤 − 𝑐𝑐) (9) 
𝑃𝑃r = 𝑝𝑝.𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀(𝑞𝑞,𝑑𝑑) −  𝑞𝑞𝑤𝑤 −𝑀𝑀𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚((𝑑𝑑 − 𝑞𝑞)𝑔𝑔, 0) (10) 
 
The aggregate channel profit in each time period is P𝑐𝑐 = P𝑠𝑠 + P𝑟𝑟. 
 
Figure 5  Agent-based simulation: state charts for supplier and retailer agents, and their interactions 
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In the simulation, demand values (d) are sampled from a truncated at zero normal distribution, N(140, 
80).  In order to ensure the efficacy and repeatability of the results, these variates are produced by 
using the Mersenne-Twister pseudo-random number generator (Matsumoto and Nishimura, 1998) 
with the same seeds for each scenario.   
 
Table 3 shows the layout of the Excel ABS model with explanations of the calculations in each 
column given in Table 4.  The model is initialised with w=0, q=0 and Pr=1000 in order to seed the 
calculations in period 1.  Any bias incurred from this initial condition is dealt with through the warm-
up period in the run strategy explained below. 
 
Table 3  Excel ABS Model: First 4 Periods of Simulation 
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) 
Period 
Random 
number 
Demand 
(d) 
Wholesale 
price (w) 
Order 
quantity 
(q) 
Orders 
satisfied 
Retailer 
profit 
(Pr) 
Supplier 
profit 
(Ps) 
Channel 
profit 
(Pc) 
0 0.523087 148.48 0 0 
 
1000 
  
1 0.570733 157.78 11.73 38.33 38.33 9013.72 
-
1466.84 7546.88 
2 0.236518 90.27 22.46 71.55 71.55 16262.66 
-
1970.44 14292.22 
3 0.721902 189.76 32.28 98.74 98.74 21406.92 
-
1749.90 19657.03 
4 0.049460 31.51 41.26 123.85 31.51 2767.98 
-
1082.05 1685.93 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . 
. . . . . . . . . 
 
Table 4  Excel ABS Model Calculations 
Column Calculation 
(b) Random number generated from Mersenne-Twister pseudo-random number generator 
(Matsumoto and Nishimura, 1998) 
(c) Demand sampled from truncated at zero normal distribution, N(140, 80) 
(d) Wholesale price (w) set by supplier’s decision model, Table 1 
(e) Order quantity (q) set by retailer’s decision model, Table 2 
(f) Orders satisfied = Min (d, q) 
(g) Pr from equation 10 
(h) Ps from equation 9 
(i) Pc = Ps + Pr 
 
We then used the ABS model to explore the overall performance of the wholesale price contract under 
all possible combinations of the inferred supplier and retailer decision-making strategies.  The 
following run strategy was adopted.  For all simulations the initial values of w and q were set to zero.  
Initialisation bias was detected using the MSER-5 heuristic (White, 1997; White et al, 2000; Hoad et 
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al, 2010) and a warm-up period of 160 time periods was selected.  This was based on the longest 
warm-up for all of the outputs.  We ran the model for 1,800 time periods.  In order to obtain accurate 
estimates of mean performance we replicated each simulation 100 times.  Excel-VBA code was used 
to perform the multiple replications using a simple for-next loop. 
 
In order to explore the wholesale price contract‘s efficiency under different, realistic interactions, we 
treated the interacting supplier’s and retailer’s decision-making strategies as the two treatment factors 
of analysis (F1: supplier, F2: retailer), with F1 appearing at 4 levels (SUPi, i=1, 2, 3, OPT) and F2 at 5 
levels (RETj, j=1, 2, 3, 4, OPT).  The rational-optimising supplier and retailer (OPT) were kept in the 
experimental design so that the human suppliers’ and retailers’ decisions could be directly compared 
with their rational-optimising counterparts’.  It also made it possible to play each human decision-
maker with a rational-optimising counterpart.  Since the total number of all possible factor 
combinations (F1F2 =20) was not prohibitively high, a full factorial ‘two way layout’ design was 
employed.  Had there been a larger number of human participants, it may have been necessary to 
employ a fractional factorial design.  For instance, a doubling in both the number of retailers and 
suppliers, to 8 and 10 respectively, would have increased the number of factor combinations fourfold 
(F1F2 =80). The results of these simulation runs are presented in the next section. 
 
5. Simulation Results  
 
We now discuss the results obtained from the simulation runs with the ABS model.  The results for 
the suppliers’ pricing decisions, the retailers’ order quantity decisions, and the efficiency attained by 
each supplier-retailer combination are reported.  For validation purposes we also discuss how these 
results compare to the results from previous experimental studies which have employed a much larger 
number of human participants. 
 
 
5.1 The Suppliers’ Pricing Decisions  
 
Table 5 presents all suppliers’ steady-state mean w -decisions over n = 100 simulated replications for 
all 20 treatment combinations studied.  Between parentheses () in italics font the standard deviation of 
the results across the replications is given, while between brackets [] in bold font the half widths of 
the corresponding 99% confidence intervals are provided.   
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Table 5 Suppliers’ w -decisions 
 
F1 
F2 
RET1 RET2 RET3 RET4 RETOPT 
SUP1 
233.99 (0.002) 
[±0.001] 
232.53 (0.015) 
[±0.004] 
233.06 (0.008) 
[±0.002] 
233.15 (0.006) 
[±0.002] 
233.36 (0) 
[±0] 
SUP2 
192.84 (0.003) 
[±0.001] 
195.59 (0.020) 
[±0.005] 
194.30 (0.012) 
[±0.003] 
192.02 (0.015) 
[±0.004] 
194.35 (0) 
[±0] 
SUP3 
146.01 (0.002) 
[±0.001] 
144.15 (0.008) 
[±0.002] 
145.24 (0.005) 
[±0.001] 
146.53 (0.014) 
[±0.004] 
145.26 (0) 
[±0] 
SUPOPT * 
174.75 (0) 
[±0] 
174.75 (0) 
[±0] 
174.75 (0) 
[±0] 
174.75 (0) 
[±0] 
174.75 (0) 
[±0] 
* w decision fixed at rational-optimising level of 174.75 
 
It is clear that a supplier’s w-decisions do not differ much when interacting with different retailers.   
This is because they almost solely focus on their previous w-decision with little cognisance of the 
retailer’s response (Table 1).  The rational-optimising supplier SUPOPT  is set to charge w*=174.75 in 
all periods and so there is no difference in this figure between simulation runs.  Because the supplier 
sets w before the retailer chooses q, and independently of previous values of q, we assume that this 
supplier consistently believes the retailer will choose to order 𝑞𝑞𝑟𝑟∗.  As a result, the supplier chooses the 
wholesale price w*=174.75 according to expression 1.  There is no variance in the suppliers’ price 
decisions during the simulation when interacting with the rational-optimising retailer.  Following an 
initial transient, the interacting supplier and retailer reach a constant equilibrium value for w and q, 
since variations in demand have no impact on their decisions (expression 2 and Table 1).   
 
The simulated human suppliers seem to adopt two different strategies for maximising their individual 
profits.  SUP1 and SUP2 adopt a ‘profit margin driven’ pricing strategy in which they attempt to 
maximise their individual profits by charging high prices, above the rational-optimising supplier.  
SUP1 follows a more extreme version of this strategy by charging the highest price.  Meanwhile, SUP3 
adopts the completely opposite ‘demand driven’ strategy, charging lower prices than would a rational-
optimising supplier, to stimulate demand.  All simulated human suppliers charge prices that are 
significantly different to the rational-optimising supplier at p<0.01.  This accords with previous 
experimental research which shows that human suppliers charge wholesale prices that are not 
consistent with the profit maximising price w*.  Keser and Paleologo (2004), Loch and Wu (2008) 
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and Wu (2013) all find that, similar to SUP3, human suppliers charge lower prices than would a 
rational-optimising supplier. 
 
5.2 The Retailers’ Order Quantity Decisions  
 
Table 6 presents all retailers’ steady-state mean q -decisions over n = 100 simulated replications for 
all 20 treatment combinations studied.  There are much greater differences between the retailers’ q -
decisions than between the suppliers’ w -decisions, both between retailers and for individual retailers 
working with different suppliers.  RET1, for instance, orders on average 18.45 items when interacting 
with SUP1, but orders on average more than five times the items (98.94) when working with SUP3.   
 
As discussed in section 5.1, the rational-optimising retailer’s order quantities reach an equilibrium 
value with no variance.  However, suppliers’ individual pricing strategies do lead to different order 
quantities when working with the rational-optimising retailer.  This is because RETOPT makes 
decisions in response to the price set by the supplier.  When the rational-optimising retailer interacts 
with the rational-optimising supplier, q =105.18, which is as predicted.      
 
Table 6 Retailers’ q -decisions 
 
F1 
F2 
RET1 RET2 RET3 RET4 RETOPT  
SUP1 
18.45 (0.077) 
[±0.020] 
70.23 (0.533) 
[±0.140] 
51.25 (0.299) 
[±0.078] 
47.99 (0.209) 
[±0.055] 
40.82 (0) 
[±0] 
SUP2 
56.10 (0.071) 
[±0.019] 
113.81 (0.414) 
[±0.109] 
86.78 (0.244) 
[±0.064] 
59.93 (0.313) 
[±0.082] 
87.72 (0) 
[±0] 
SUP3 
98.94 (0.076) 
[±0.020] 
172.43 (0.311) 
[±0.082] 
129.63 (0.196) 
[±0.052] 
78.61 (0.549) 
[±0.144 
128.83 (0) 
[±0] 
SUPOPT 
72.65 (0.075) 
[±0.020] 
137.81 (0.382) 
[±0.100] 
104.11 (0.231) 
[±0.061] 
66.56 (0.390) 
[±0.102] 
105.18 (0) 
[±0] 
 
 
RET1 and RET4 order quantities that are consistently lower than the rational-optimising retailer in 
response to each supplier, with the exception of the interaction RET4- SUP1.  It seems that they are 
employing a strategy of ‘minimising excess stock’.  RET2 consistently orders much higher quantities 
from each supplier than RETOPT.  His ordering behaviour seems to be driven by his strong preference 
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to ‘maximise sales’ by avoiding stock-outs.  RET3’s order quantities do not differ substantially from 
those of the rational-optimising retailer when working with each supplier.  The only exception is for 
the case where he interacts with SUP1, who charges the highest prices.  It appears that RET3 is 
attempting to balance excess stock minimisation with sales maximisation. 
 
As predicted by previous experimental research, all the retailers’ order quantities are significantly 
different to the rational-optimising retailer (i.e. q≠q*: at p<0.01).  Cases where the human retailers 
under order are highlighted in Table 6.  Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) and Bostian et al (2008) 
similarly found cases of under ordering in their experimental research.  The unshaded cells represent 
cases where the retailers over ordered, a result that is consistent with the findings of Elahi et al (2013).  
 
5.3 Supply Chain Efficiency Scores  
 
Table 7 presents the mean efficiency scores (Eff) over n=100 replications achieved by all 20 treatment 
combinations studied.  First we note that when the two rational-optimising decision-makers interact in 
the simulation (SUPOPT-RETOPT), the efficiency score is 0.741 with no variance, as is expected from 
the analytical result. 
 
Table 7 Supplier-retailer efficiency scores 
 
F1 
F2 
RET1 RET2 RET3 RET4 RETOPT 
SUP1 
0.150 (0.001) 
[±0.000] 
0.527 (0.006) 
[±0.002] 
0.397 (0.003) 
[±0.001] 
0.375 (0.003) 
[±0.001] 
0.320 (0.001) 
[±0.000] 
SUP2 
0.434 (0.002) 
[±0.001] 
0.778 (0.008) 
[±0.002] 
0.636 (0.005) 
[±0.001] 
0.461 (0.005) 
[±0.001] 
0.644 (0.005) 
[±0.001] 
SUP3 
0.708 (0.005) 
[±0.001] 
0.968 (0.012) 
[±0.003] 
0.851 (0.009) 
[±0.002] 
0.585 (0.008) 
[±0.002] 
0.849 (0.008) 
[±0.002] 
SUPOPT 
0.550 (0.003) 
[±0.001] 
0.878 (0.010) 
[±0.003] 
0.734 (0.007) 
[±0.002] 
0.507 (0.006) 
[±0.002] 
0.741 (0.006) 
[±0.002] 
 
With the exception of the interaction SUPOPT-RETOPT, in every case the efficiency scores differ 
significantly from 0.741 (Eff=0.741: at p<0.01).  In 14 of the interactions the efficiency is less than 
expected from the interaction of rational-optimising decision-makers (Eff<0.741: at p<0.01).  
However, in five of the interactions, highlighted in Table 7, the efficiency is greater than expected 
(Eff>0.741: at p<0.01).  We characterise these as ‘high-performing’ partnerships, since they achieve 
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efficiency scores above those achieved by self-interested rational-optimising partners.  This finding is 
in line with that of Katok and Wu (2009) who similarly found instances where higher than predicted 
efficiency scores were achieved by human decision-makers.   
 
In order to help identify which supplier and retailer strategies lead to the highest efficiency scores, 
their strategies are summarised in Table 8.  The first row in each cell identifies the supplier’s strategy 
and the second row shows the retailer’s strategy.  The cells are un-shaded for partnerships with 
Eff<0.741; they are light shaded for partnerships with Eff=0.741; and they are shaded dark for 
partnerships with Eff>0.741.  It is immediately obvious that the demand driven strategy of SUP3 is the 
most consistently successful among the suppliers.  Meanwhile the most successful retailer is RET2 
who follows a sales maximisation strategy.  This highlights that the best strategy for maximising 
channel profit in the newsvendor problem presented in this paper is for the supplier to stimulate 
demand by charging low wholesale prices and for the retailer to order high quantities in order to try 
and maximise sales.  It is when these two strategies meet through the interaction of SUP3 with RET2 
that the highest level of profit is achieved (Eff=0.968).  
 
 
Table 8 Supplier-retailer strategies (row 1 shows supplier strategy, row 2 shows retailer strategy) 
 
F1 
F2 
RET1 RET2 RET3 RET4 RETOPT 
SUP1 
Profit margin 
Min. Stock 
Profit margin 
Max. Sales 
Profit margin 
Balanced 
Profit margin 
Min. Stock 
Profit margin 
Optimise 
SUP2 
Profit margin 
Min. Stock 
Profit margin 
Max. Sales 
Profit margin 
Balanced 
Profit margin 
Min. Stock 
Profit margin 
Optimise 
SUP3 
Demand driven 
Min. Stock 
Demand driven  
Max. Sales 
Demand driven 
Balanced 
Demand driven 
Min. Stock 
Demand driven  
Optimise 
SUPOPT 
Optimise 
Min. Stock 
Optimise  
Max. Sales 
Optimise  
Balanced 
Optimise  
Min. Stock 
Optimise  
Optimise 
 
Key 
 Eff<0.741 
 Eff=0.741 
 Eff>0.741 
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5.4 Comparison to Results from Previous Studies 
 
The efficacy of our approach is, in-part, determined by whether the ABS reproduces results from 
previous studies that employed a much larger number of participants.  Table 9 summarises the 
findings from previous studies and then compares these with the findings from the ABS.  The 
comparison is made across the three key results reported in this and other newsvendor studies: the 
decisions made by the suppliers and the retailers, and their performance, reported here as supply chain 
efficiency.   
 
Table 9  Comparison of results from this study with predictions from previous work 
Result Prediction from previous work Findings from this study 
Suppliers’ pricing 
decisions 
Human suppliers charge lower prices 
than a rational-optimising supplier. 
Keser and Paleologo (2004), Loch and 
Wu (2008) and Wu (2013) 
SUP3 charges lower prices than a 
rational-optimising supplier. 
 
 
SUP1 and SUP2 charge higher prices 
than a rational-optimising supplier. 
Retailers’ order 
quantity 
decisions 
Human retailers order less than a 
rational-optimising retailer. 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) and 
Bostian et al (2008) 
Human retailers order more than a 
rational-optimising retailer. 
Elahi et al (2013) 
RET1 consistently under orders. 
 
 
 
RET2 consistently over orders.  
 
 
RET3 and RET4 under or over order 
depending on which supplier they work 
with. 
Supply chain 
efficiency 
Human decision-makers can generate 
higher efficiency scores than rational-
optimising decision-makers. 
Katok and Wu (2009) 
Three instances identified of a human 
supplier and human retailer generating 
higher efficiency scores than the 
pairing of a rational-optimising supplier 
and retailer. 
 
Using our approach, we are able to identify similar outcomes to those of previous studies for 
suppliers’ pricing decisions, retailers’ order quantity decisions and the efficiency of the supply chain.  
We have not been able to identify a previous study in which suppliers charge higher prices than the 
rational-optimising supplier, as did SUP1 and SUP2.  However, it is not unlikely that such a result can 
occur with decision-makers that have limited knowledge and information.  It is interesting that RET3 
and RET4 under or over order depending on which supplier they work with; something that, as far as 
we know, has not been identified in previous studies.  This finding has emerged because, unlike other 
studies, the ABS has allowed us to play all participants with each other.   
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6. Discussion 
 
Our purpose is to explore the use of ABS as a means for addressing issues of sample size in 
experimental research.  The sample size issue is seen from three perspectives: the number of 
participants, the number of decisions each participant makes, and the number of pairings of 
participants.  The contribution of our approach has been to address all three issues. 
 
Previous studies of the newsvendor problem utilise at least 100 participants, with the exception of 
Schweitzer and Cachon (2000) who use a smaller sample of 34 and 44 in their two experiments.  Our 
experiment only involves seven participants (four retailers and three suppliers).  We are not claiming 
to be able to improve the statistical power of the results if we wish to draw conclusions about the 
range of human behaviours when interacting with the automated retailer or supplier.  Nor are we 
claiming to be able to map the full set of possible decision-making strategies.  These requirements 
would need a much larger sample size.  Our sample of seven participants, however, does enable us to 
learn the decision-making strategies of each of these individuals. 
 
Our review of supply chain experimental research shows that participants are asked to complete 
between 15 and 200 rounds of decision-making.  In order to collect the required information to learn a 
participant’s decision-making strategy in our experiment, a sample of 50 decisions is taken.  However, 
once the decision model is implemented in the ABS there is no effective limit to the number of 
decisions that can be played out.  In our example, the model is run for 1,800 decisions and replicated 
100 times.  As such, in each pairing of retailers and suppliers, we are able to generate 180,000 
decisions for each participant, and so 360,000 decisions.  Given that we then run 20 combinations of 
participant pairs, the total number of decisions generated is 7.2 million; and this only takes a few 
minutes to generate with the ABS.  This is orders of magnitude greater than achieved from even the 
larger of previous experimental studies, such as Katok and Wu (2009), who generate a total of 4,000 
decisions from their participants.  To collect millions of decisions with human participants would 
clearly be impracticable. 
 
Previous studies seem to have only been able to collect data from unique pairings of participants.  
However, once the decision models have been created and embodied in the ABS it is possible to pair 
every retailer participant with every supplier participant.  As such, the limitation on the number of 
pairings that can interact through the ‘game’ is not driven by the availability of the human 
participants.   
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So, the ABS enables as many participant decisions to be generated as required and all combinations of 
participants to be paired together.  As a result, many more participant decisions and many more 
participant pairings can be observed than would be possible with human participants.  The sample 
sizes generated by the ABS for each pairing of participants means that results with sufficient 
statistical power can be generated.  Indeed, our results, generated from only seven human participants, 
accord with the findings from previous studies which involved many more participants. 
 
Our approach has some other advantages.  The requirement for only a small number of participants 
means that experimental research does not need to be restricted to the convenience of using students.  
It makes it possible to work with a small sample of real decision-makers.  Smaller sample sizes also 
have the benefit of reducing the time involved in running experiments with human participants and 
the total cost of incentivising participation. 
 
Of course, our experimental approach and use of ABS is not without its limitations.  A key issue is the 
extent to which a small sample of participants provides reasonable coverage of all possible decision-
making strategies.  Figure 6 illustrates this problem.  By using seven decision-makers, we have 
obtained results for the full set of 12 possible pairings of real decision-makers (4 retailers x 3 
suppliers).  These are discrete points in a much larger solution space in which there are many other 
possible outcomes, at least some of which are almost certainly better.  We have no knowledge of 
where on the solution space the pairings lie.  Nor do we know the shape of the surface; where better 
and worse ‘solutions’ might lie.  The fact that our results accord with the findings of a number of 
studies with many more participants suggests that we have achieved a reasonable coverage of the 
solution space.  This, however, is purely felicitous given that we made no attempt to select a range of 
decision-maker types in our sample. 
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Figure 6  Schematic of decision-maker pairings and full solution space of all possible decision-
making strategies and pairings 
 
 
Whether this is a concern depends on the objective of the study.  If our aim is to understand and 
predict the outcome of current decision-making strategies, then the nature of the solution space is of 
less importance.  We may simply want to know why some pairings perform better in order to help the 
other decision-makers perform to the same level.  However, if we wish to search the solution space, 
particularly with a view to ‘optimising’ decision-making, then the approach is inadequate since we 
have learnt little about the solution space.  Of course, a large sample of participants would help to 
address this by giving a better understanding of the solution space.  This returns us to the first sample 
size problem: the number of participants.  We envisage two ways in which this could be mitigated.  
The first would involve using personality tests such as Myers-Briggs (Myers and Briggs, 1995) to 
select participants; a form of stratified sampling.  The difficulty here is choosing an appropriate test 
for the decision situation.  The second approach would not require additional participants, but rather 
the creation of artificial participants generated by adjusting the decision-making models.  In our case 
this would mean adjusting the regression coefficients to create alternative decision-making strategies.  
This would require careful consideration of the range within which coefficients could be adjusted and 
of the practical meaning of the different decision-making models. 
 
A second issue is the extent to which human participants strategies in a gaming environment are 
similar to those they would employ if the decisions were real.  This issue not only affects the ABS 
approach, but any laboratory experiment.  The use of financial incentives, frequently employed in 
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experimental research, is one way to try and mitigate this effect.  The impact of financial incentives 
on participant effort and performance is a complex phenomenon.  Both Camerer and Hogarth (1999) 
and Bonner and Sprinkle (2002) perform an extensive review of experimental studies and the use of 
financial incentives.  They find a mixture of effects, complicated by the difficulty of the task and the 
nature of the participants. 
 
The regression models for representing the participants’ decision-making strategies all provided a 
reasonable good fit to the data (0.724 ≤ adj. R2 ≤ 0.958).  There remains, however, up to 28% of the 
variation in decisions that is not explained by the regression models.  This will impact on the validity 
of the ABS model.  To address this, alternative approaches for representing the decision-making 
strategies could be employed such as artificial neural networks or rule-based expert systems.  We 
would, however, always expect some level of error (residuals for regression models) in the decision 
functions due to variability in human decision-making; given the same scenario an individual is 
unlikely to make exactly the same decision on every occasion that the scenario is presented.  
Approaches for representing this variability in agent behaviour could be explored. 
 
A fourth limitation arises from the participants interacting with an automated decision-maker.  This 
mitigates the effects arising from social preference and reputation, but it means that the ABS model 
only represents a single decision-making strategy for each participant.  In practice, participants are 
likely to adjust their decision-making strategy according to whom they are interacting with.  This may 
limit the benefit of learning a single participant strategy and then assuming that same strategy would 
be used when interacting with all other decision-makers.   
 
Future research could aim to explore and address these limitations.  Beyond this, it would be useful to 
repeat this study with different newsvendor problem parameter settings in order to understand the 
impact on individual’s decision-making and on the ABS approach.  It would also be of interest to 
adopt the ABS approach in a more complex setting with more than two decision-makers interacting 
with one another.  An obvious candidate would be to perform similar experiments with the beer 
distribution game (Sterman, 2000).   
 
7. Conclusion 
 
As work in behavioural OR develops, laboratory based experimental research is set become of 
increasing importance to OR research.  Our work demonstrates the potential for ABS to enhance the 
scope of such experimental research.  We encourage further developments in the use of ABS to 
support experimental work and research in behavioural OR. 
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